This project was formally initiated in September 1997, two and a half months after the Treaty of Amsterdam had been agreed by the EU Heads o f State and Government. The Treaty marked a turning point o f the institutional basis o f European foreign policy. Title V o f the Treaty on European Union was amended, introducing Common Strategies, a new post as High Representative for the CFSP, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, incorporating the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty, opening up for a common defence, the integration o f the Western European Union into the EU, constructive abstention and on some issues also qualified majority voting. Crucial political progress has also taken place in the course o f the last decade or two regarding the creation o f the Common European Security and Defence Policy, the EU’s unity o f voice in most international organisations, the increasing use o f economic sanctions, and the rapprochement o f Member State positions in the question of the Middle East Peace Process. The gradual progress o f European foreign policy however stands in sharp contrast with the general perception o f the actual capabilities o f European foreign policy since the beginning of the European Political Cooperation in 1970. The disaster evolving for the European Union’s foreign policy ambitions in the Western Balkans throughout the 1990s and the institutional unanimity voting system are only two o f many more illustrations o f this contrasting paralysis. The image o f European foreign policy viewed by this project was thus initially one reflecting the paradox o f simultaneous presence o f progress and paralysis of European foreign policy, cutting across variables and time. Following this image was always the audio o f voices discussing the degree to which EU, Europeans, the West, and the leaders o f our time have been able to learn any lessons from their past failures (or in theory also successes). Not many events were allowed to pass, without hearing the choir o f voices claiming what we have or should have learned from Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, or any other crisis or conflict intervention. Characteristically, these learning claims were formulated in an implicit way and against a seemingly dubious background, assuming everyone to be perfectly aware o f the theoretical or practical justifications for the ability of actors to learn in international relations. As the concept o f learning continued to re-emerge in this relatively vaguely defined manner, the idea thus came to dedicate this project to examine whether learning may explain the image o f the dichotomy o f progress and paralysis o f European foreign policy, what the conditions are for learning to take place, and which lessons may be learned from the past regarding European foreign policy in international relations in theory and in practice.