I am going to make some more progress, if I may. Secondly, the Government have committed to ensuring that the withdrawal agreement with the EU can be fully implemented in UK law by exit day. The clause 9 power to implement the withdrawal agreement will be crucial in achieving this in the way I have described. This power will help to ensure we are in a position to swiftly implement the contents of the withdrawal agreement required to be in place for day one, ensuring maximum legal certainty upon exit. Again, I respectfully remind hon. Members that, if the UK is unable to implement the withdrawal agreement in time, that risks us being unable to meet our obligations under international law and scuppering the prospects of the very deal I think Members on all sides want to achieve. To ensure a smooth and orderly exit, it is essential that appropriate legislative changes have been made by the point of exit. We want to give ourselves the capability to make those appropriate changes swiftly, and to support businesses and individuals and make sure the country is ready. The power in the Bill enables that, and those aims will be put at risk by these amendments. I now turn briefly to amendments 227, 228 and 229, which prevent the clause 9 power from being used until a number of economic assessments have been published. The Government have been undertaking rigorous and extensive analysis to support our exit negotiations, to define our future partnership with the EU and to inform our understanding of how EU exit will affect the UK's domestic policies. The Government have already established a process for providing economic and fiscal reports. The OBR independently produces official forecasts for the Government and is required to produce detailed five-year forecasts for the economy and public finances twice a year at autumn Budget and spring statement. Those forecasts reflect publicly stated Government policy at the time that those forecasts are made, and that includes policy on leaving the EU. We have been very clear that we will not disclose material that might undermine the UK in the negotiations. In particular, in any negotiation, information on potential economic considerations is very important to the negotiating capital and negotiating position of all parties. The Government want to get the best deal for the UK and hope-and, indeed, are confident-that this House is united in that goal, even if the means to achieve it may differ on some aspects of detail, and we do not want the UK's negotiating position to be undermined. For that reason, we cannot support those amendments. Amendment 230 requests an assessment of the broader responsibility of the Treasury. That is unnecessary. The Treasury's core purpose is to be an effective finance and economics Ministry. As a finance Ministry, the Treasury will continue to account for public expenditure and manage the public finances. As an economics Ministry, it will continue to prioritise policy that reduces obstacles to growth, and manage key relationships with finance Ministries overseas. The Government do not see the UK's withdrawal from the EU changing those core responsibilities of the Treasury, and an assessment to confirm that would be a waste of valuable public finances and is unnecessary. I turn now to amendments 262 and 263. The Government recognise the huge importance of the legal services sector to the UK economy; it contributed £24 billion in 2015. The Government also recognise that legal services underpin many other important parts of the UK economy, including financial services, manufacturing and the creative industries. We propose a bold and ambitious partnership between the UK and the EU, and we will prioritise securing the freest trade possible in services. The Government are committed to securing the best deal for the legal profession. In the Government's July position paper, “Ongoing Union judicial and administrative proceedingsâ€, the Government also made it clear that leaving the EU will end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court. At the same time, the UK is committed to minimising uncertainty and disruption for individuals and businesses, including those arising from changes in the treatment of cases pending at the time of exit. That is why we want an agreement on an implementation period based on the existing structure of rules and regulations, so that there is only one set of changes. The laying of such reports, as proposed in the amendments, would delay and impede the important legislative work necessary to prepare the legal services sector for all possible negotiation outcomes, and I urge hon. Members to withdraw the amendments. Amendment 343 would prevent regulations from being made under clause 9 before the Secretary of State had laid before Parliament a strategy for a food standards framework after EU withdrawal. The UK has a world-leading set of standards on food safety and quality, backed up by a rigorous legislative framework. The Department of Health, the Food Standards Agency and other relevant Government bodies are working closely together to ensure that the regulatory regime for food safety remains robust as Britain leaves the EU. The Government are committed to ensuring high food standards at home and promoting high standards internationally. There will be opportunities to build on our world-leading reputation for quality and standards, but it would not be appropriate for the Government to tie their use of the clause 9 power to the publishing of any individual or particular reports. The purpose of clause 9 is to incorporate the withdrawal agreement fully and comprehensively into UK law, so that we can fulfil our obligations under the withdrawal agreement and under international law. The power is not intended to be used to report on the Government's post-exit domestic strategy. To caveat the power or to define it in that way would cause uncertainty, both for our EU partners and for businesses and citizens in this country. I hope that I have addressed as many of the amendments relating to clause 9 as possible, and that clause 9 will now stand part of the Bill unamended. I shall now turn briefly to clauses 16 and 17 and schedule 7. Clause 16 gives effect to schedule 7, which provides for the parliamentary scrutiny of the secondary legislation made under the powers in the Bill, including under clause 9. The Bill attempts to strike a balance between the need to prepare our statute book in time for the end of the article 50 process and the need, on the other side, for Parliament to undertake proper scrutiny. The Bill does this using long-established parliamentary procedures. These are the usual procedures that have been used by all Governments for decades with no dilution of the normal scrutiny process. However, the Government have always said that we would listen and reflect on the concerns raised by the House. We understand the concern that there might not be enough scrutiny of the instruments made under the Bill. That is why the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), made it clear in the Committee yesterday that the Government would support the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), which I hope will be supported by the whole of this Committee. These amendments draw on the Procedure Committee's expertise and its recent interim report, and will ensure that the House has an opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of the use of the procedure for instruments made under the three main powers in the Bill. The amendments do this without undermining the certainty that we wish to provide. For instruments brought forward under clause 9, as with the other powers in the Bill, this means thatÂ where the Government propose the negative procedure for an instrument, the House will be able to recommend that it should instead be debated and voted on as an affirmative instrument, giving an even clearer voice to this House in scrutinising how these powers are used. Other instruments, if not made using the urgency procedure-which I will come to-will be affirmative, guaranteeing the opportunity for a debate on the instrument. Schedule 7 sets out a series of triggers for the use of the affirmative procedure. These are for some of the substantial uses of the power or for those where more complex decisions are required-for example, creating a new public body, creating new fees or other charges, or creating new powers to legislate. The Minister responsible for the instrument can also choose the affirmative procedure even where the instrument does not meet any of the tests in schedule 7. We have taken the same approach to changes to either primary or secondary legislation. Some changes to primary legislation can be mechanistic and minor, and adopting the affirmative procedure for small corrections to primary legislation would be impractical. Instead, the requirement for affirmative procedures is based on the type of change rather than the type of legislation in which the change is being made. In rare cases, there are urgency procedures, both in the Bill as introduced and in the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee. I can assure the Committee that we would only use those procedures very sparingly-for example, in cases where there was a clear practical reason to have a correction made in time for exit day or for a particular other day when limited time was available. Such a situation could arise, for example, because the content of a particular statutory instrument was dependent on a negotiation that took place nearer the end of the exit process. I know there are amendments on the paper today, such as those in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie)-I am trying to see whether he is still in his place, but no, he is not at the moment-which seek to restrict the use of this power to “emergencyâ€ situations. I hope the Committee will understand that the word “emergencyâ€ is not quite right in these circumstances, and that “urgencyâ€ is the more accurate description if we are to ensure that we have legal certainty. Finally-I am grateful to the Committee for its patience-clause 17 is designed to make consequential and transitional provision to other laws as a result, not of our exit from the EU, but of the operation of the Bill. It contains powers to ensure that the Bill is properly bedded into the statute book and could be used, for instance, for housekeeping tasks such as revoking designation orders.