I have considerable sympathy with the points just made by the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh). Exactly at which point to create which cut-off when dealing with Francovich is a knotty issue, but the idea that people whose rights already exist and who are damaged before exit should be prohibited from pursuing causes that they would have been able pursue now had they had the wit to start them now is pretty offensive to natural justice, and I hope that those on the Treasury Bench will come forward with some adjustment to paragraph 4 of schedule 1. I mainly wish to dwell on the two other issues that have been raised in this interesting debate, which has been much more of a genuine Committee stage debate than some of the debates, or some parts of them, that we have had in the previous two days' consideration. The first is on the charter of fundamental rights, where I thought the argument was largely being won by those who argued that it was not productive to have the general principles in that charter brought into UK law, provided that we could satisfy ourselves that case law and statute between them would cover off all the material and substantive rights contained within the charter. I was therefore extremely heartened to hear the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), say that there was going to be a full analysis, which I hope will be sufficient to persuade us all that all the rights are covered off in some other way. If they are, the points that were made about the dangers of judicial activism, which is positively invited by the charter of fundamental rights, would outweigh any advantage to the charter's incorporation. Before I come to the main point I want to make about paragraph 3 of schedule 1, I wish to observe, as a slight qualification to some of the things that have been said in Committee, that an element of judicial activism will not only be made possible but actually be required by the Bill, because it refers repeatedly to retained principles and it is impossible for judges to engage in the application of principles without their engaging in judicial activism that goes beyond simply reading the plain face of statutes and the like. This is all a very grey area. With that in mind, I come to amendment 10, tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), and paragraph 3 of schedule 1. His amendment refers to paragraphs 1 to 3, but in my view it refers mainly to paragraph 3. There is currently a great oddity in the way the Bill is cast. I very much hope that not too long from now my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General will come to the Dispatch Box and resolve this problem, but it is important to set out the nature of the problem. Clause 5(2) clearly establishes the principle of the supremacy of EU law so far as the past is concerned. It spells it out in awesome terms, by including the“disapplication or quashing of any enactment or rule of lawâ€-if that phrase has any meaning-“passed or made before exit day.â€Clause 6(3)(a), which we discussed on a previous day, makes it entirely clear, at least in relation to the ordinary operation of the lower courts-my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and I are still discussing with Ministers on the Treasury Bench the vexed question of the Supreme Court-that not only retained case law but“any retained general principles of EU lawâ€are to be applied by the courts. It is therefore a strange state of affairs that if we look at schedule 1, we discover that no court or tribunal will be able do the very things that the combination of clauses 5(2) and 6(3) require. No court or tribunal will be able to apply the general principles of EU law to quash or be supreme over any existing UK law. We can have a Bill that says one thing or we can have a Bill that says the opposite, but we cannot properly have a Bill that says in one part of it one thing and in another part the opposite of that thing, so some change is required. That much is, I think, simply a matter of analytical fact. My preference, which I hope the Solicitor General is going to reflect in his remarks, is for a change of the kind that has come up in various exchanges this afternoon. It is considerably more modest than the rather uncharacteristically complete, sweeping amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. I would simply amend paragraph 3(2) of schedule 1 in such a way as to ensure that it refers to general principles of EU law other than retained principles. At that point, it seems to me, rationality would re-enter the scene, because we would then be saying that after exit day a court in the UK could not use later principles developed by the CJEU-or indeed, while we are at it, any charters or other documents produced by the EU-to overrule English statute, which would of course be a natural and proper consequence of our leaving the EU.