My amendment 137 seeks to ensure that:“When interpreting retained EU law after exit day a court or tribunal shall pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court.â€The Minister questioned the term “due regardâ€, but it is not unknown to international law. The Lugano Convention on the mutual recognition on enforcement of judgments, to which EU and non-EU states are signatories, talks about paying “due accountâ€, but I have followed the recommendation of the organisation Justice that it is clearer and better English to talk about paying “due regardâ€. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, we have a duty to take account of decisions of the Court of Justice, so paying “due regardâ€ to taking account of such decisions is not a phrase unknown. This amendment is not a Trojan horse designed to continue references after Brexit, and I say that as someone who does not want Brexit to happen. It is designed to create certainty for individuals, businesses and litigants, and also for the judiciary. It would leave it open to British courts to disagree with the Court of Justice's interpretation, even if its case law was relevant to the case. It would not-as the Government's current draft does-give an unfettered, politically controversial discretion to consider or ignore Court of Justice decisions as our courts saw fit. The test set out in my amendment has three advantages. First, it would create legal certainty for individuals and businesses. Secondly, it would provide political cover for the courts. Thirdly, it seems to fit with the preference of the judiciary, who want a clear instruction. In recent evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Lady Hale, the new President of the Supreme Court, said:“It should be made plain in statute what authority or lack of authority, or weight or lack of weight, is to be given to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union after we have left, in relation both to matters that arose before we left and, more importantly, to matters after we leave. That is not something weâ€-she means “we, the judgesâ€-“would like to have to make up for ourselves, obviously, because it is very much a political question, and we would like statute to tell us the answer.â€In my submission, under my amendment, statute would tell the judges the answer. That is not just my view. The Institute for Government looked at the various options and concluded that the wording that I now propose would license courts in the UK to refer to the Court of Justice's reasoning in future judgments without making those Court of Justice judgments binding on the UK courts-