I do not want to pre-empt the agreement that I believe can and will be reached in the not-too-distant future through the JMC process. That is not what we are legislating for. We are legislating for providing continuity and certainty across the UK. I have just described how we can ensure that that delivers for every part of the UK. That is important. Amendments 168 and 175 are related to the amendments I have just discussed. They would remove the restrictions on devolved authorities using the correcting power and the withdrawal agreement power to confer functions that correspond to EU tertiary legislation. Examples of tertiary legislation include the vast majority of the technical detail of financial services law, which is set out in a form of tertiary legislation known as binding technical standards. They are functions that are currently exercised at EU level. Just as with direct, retained EU laws, the rules made under them apply uniformly across the UK. We therefore believe that where such functions need to continue, it is right and consistent with our overall approach for the decisions about who should exercise them to sit at UK level. Of course, it will be possible for UK Ministers to confer such functions on the devolved Administrations or devolved public bodies, if we agree together that that is appropriate. That will be subject to the wider negotiations on shared frameworks. I will deal with amendments 166 and 170, again tabled by the hon. Member for North East Fife and amendment 173, which the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth tabled. They would allow the devolved Administrations to sub-delegate the powers conferred on them by schedule 2. We do not advocate prohibiting sub-delegation by the devolved Administrations in every circumstance. It is explicit on the face of the Bill that sub-delegation is permitted for rules and procedures for courts and tribunals. Rather, it is our view that these powers should not be broader than is appropriate, and that sub-delegation by devolved Administrations should therefore not be admitted in every circumstance. However, as I said to the Committees, I should welcome any examples of areas in which Members believe that sub-delegation by devolved Administrations would be needed, and I will take away and consider any examples that are provided today. We are having discussions with the devolved Administrations as well, so they will also have opportunities to provide such examples. Amendment 317 would take the unusual step of conferring on Welsh Ministers the power to make consequential and transitional provision. That is because the corresponding amendment to clause 17 would prevent UK Ministers from using the power in relation to matters that are within the competence of Welsh Ministers. It is not normal to confer such powers on devolved Ministers in an Act of Parliament. The Wales Act 2017 contained the power, but conferred it only on UK Ministers. Despite the great constitutional significance of that Act, there were neither calls for the power to be taken from UK Ministers in relation to devolved matters in Wales, nor calls for it to be granted to Welsh Ministers. In the interests of transparency and accountability, we have sought to include in the Bill a number of significant consequential and transitional provisions that are necessary in relation to devolved matters. I should welcome any further explanation of instances in which devolved Administrations would need to make such types of consequential amendment. We do not currently think that there is any need for the power to be conferred on devolved Ministers as a result of the Bill that would reverse usual practice, and I urge Members not to press the amendment to a vote. Let me finally deal with amendments 169, 172 and 176. I thank Members for their careful consideration of these technical provisions. The amendments relate to clauses that provide safeguards to ensure that due consideration is given when Ministers in devolved Administrations use their powers in ways that have implications for the rest of the UK. The amendments would, in effect, convert the requirements for devolved Ministers to gain the consent of UK Ministers when exercising the powers in certain circumstances into consultation requirements. Let me turn first to the requirements included for international obligations and withdrawal agreement powers. Here the safeguards are focused principally on obligations that will need to be met at a UK level: the management of UK-wide quotas and our UK obligations under the World Trade Organisation agreement. We therefore believe that there is an important role for the UK Government to play in agreeing such amendments in these limited circumstances, given the broader consequences for other parts of the UK. Indeed, where the powers exist in order to implement the UK's international agreements, it is important that that can be done expeditiously and fairly within the UK so that we can meet those international obligations, and that requires a common view across the UK. Again, we have taken the view that the right approach is to require consent for that purpose. A requirement of consent provides a clear and decisive process for us to ensure that the interests of each part of the UK are taken into account. The requirements included for the correcting power are primarily concerned with our relationship with the EU. It is right that we consider any use of such powers that could prejudice the EU negotiations, and that is why we think it is right to include the consent requirements in the Bill. I have made it clear that the Government stand ready to listen to those who have sincere suggestions for how we might improve the Bill. Today we have had a useful debate on this subject, and hon. Members have made the case that requiring consent might not be the right approach to the practical problem that I have described in relation to the correcting power in particular. Scottish Conservative Members and others have expressed concern about the issue. However, I assure the Committee that we will take away and carefully reflect on the suggestions that have been made today, and consider whether sufficient assurances can be provided through different means.