I could not agree more. That is exactly what new clause 58 would do; it would provide enhanced protection for equality, rights and protections after we have left the EU. Taken at face value, clauses 2 to 4 appear relatively straightforward. But, as many hon. Members who spoke in yesterday's debate made clear, the Bill as drafted creates a considerable degree of ambiguity and uncertainty as to the status of retained EU law. Currently the status of rights, protections and standards underpinned by EU law is distinct. Treaty provisions and regulations that take effect through section 2(1) of the ECA are neither primary nor secondary legislation. The principle of the supremacy of EU law and the ECA means that, in practice, they have a particular constitutional status that enables them to take priority over primary legislation enacted by Parliament. Similarly, secondary legislation made under section 2(2) of the ECA is distinct from other secondary legislation in that it could take priority over primary legislation because of the fact that it is giving effect to an EU law obligation. Primary legislation that gives effect to an EU law obligation could be amended by Parliament, but any removal of an underlying EU law could be challenged in the courts. Post-exit, it is unclear what status-primary, secondary or something else entirely-retained EU law will have. From schedule 1, one might draw the inference that retained EU law has the characteristics of secondary, rather than primary, legislation. Yet paragraph 19 of schedule 8 provides that, for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, direct EU legislation“is to be treated as primary legislationâ€, although this schedule does not cover those rights recognised and made available in domestic law after exit by means of clause 4. Clauses 5 and 6 provide guidance as to how the courts should interpret retained EU law in the event of a conflict with an enactment passed after exit day, but it is not yet clear-as we debated at length yesterday-whether the courts will treat particular retained EU laws as constitutional legislation that is not susceptible to implied repeal. The uncertainty that surrounds the status and interpretation of retained EU law is a real weakness of the legislation and it is crucial that it is clarified and addressed on the face of the Bill. But, irrespective of what status particular retained EU laws are eventually accorded, this new category of law-detached from the enhanced protection enjoyed as a result of being underwritten by our membership of the EU-will be vulnerable to amendment not just from the delegated powers contained in this Bill, but from subordinate legislation contained in other Acts of Parliament.